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We model the opportunities and incentives generated by international tax differences for 
international profit shifting by multinationals. Unlike previous work, we consider not only profit 
shifting arising from international tax differences between affiliates and parent companies, but 
also from tax differences between affiliates in different host countries. Our model yields the 
prediction that a multinational’s profit shifting in a country depends on a weighted average of 
international tax rate differences between all countries where the multinational is active. Using a 
unique dataset containing detailed firm-level information on the parent companies and 
subsidiaries of European multinationals and detailed information about the international tax 
system, we test our model and empirically examine the extent of intra-European profit shifting by 
European multinationals. On average, we find a semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to 
the top statutory tax rate of 1.43, while shifting costs are estimated to be 1.6 percent of the tax 
base. International profit shifting leads to a substantial redistribution of national corporate tax 
revenues. Many European nations appear to gain revenues from profit shifting by multinationals 
largely at the expense of Germany. 
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  -1-1. Introduction 
 
Corporate income taxation continues to be a national affair in Europe despite economic 
integration brought on by free trade and the single currency. Corporate income in Europe is taxed 
at different rates in different countries. Cross-border income flows within the multinational may 
in addition be subject to double taxation, even if some form of double tax relief is normally 
provided. Europe’s current corporate tax system no doubt distorts the international allocation of 
real activity. A voluminous literature specifically suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows are sensitive to taxation (see Gresik (2001) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for recent 
surveys). Tax rate differences further provide multinationals with incentives to re-allocate 
accounting profits internationally so as to reduce their worldwide corporate tax liability. The 
scope for international profit shifting for tax purposes is considerable in Europe, as large 
European multinational firms typically operate in many, if not all, European countries. 
 
A multinational can shift profits from high-tax countries to low-tax countries through a 
variety of techniques. First, a multinational can manipulate its transfer prices for international, 
intra-firm transactions. Specifically, the multinational can reduce accounting profits in a high-tax 
country by overstating the prices of imports into this country and conversely by understating the 
prices of exports. Several studies, mainly based on U.S. data and surveyed by Hines (1999) and 
Newlon (2000), find evidence of profit shifting through the manipulation of transfer prices. 
Clausing (2003), for instance, reports some direct evidence that intra-firm trade prices deviate 
from outside, ‘arm’s length’ prices in ways that are consistent with international tax 
minimization. Second, the multinational can affect the international allocation of accounting 
profits through its financial structure. Particularly, by assigning (high-interest) debt to high-tax 
locales the multinational firm can reduce its worldwide tax bill.
1 Thirdly, the multinational can 
aim to re-assign common expenses, such as R&D expenses or headquarter services, to high-tax 
countries, thereby reducing accounting profits in these countries. International profit shifting, by 
any technique, imposes potentially significant accounting and other costs on the firm. 
 
International profit shifting efforts, if effective, should reduce multinational company 
profits reported in high-tax countries. For the case of U.S. outward FDI, Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) indeed find a negative relationship between the reported profitability and tax burdens in 
foreign countries. Hines and Rice (1994) [henceforth, HR] similarly investigate the relationship 
between the profitability of U.S. FDI abroad and foreign tax burdens after controlling for labor 
and capital inputs in these countries. Profits reported abroad by U.S. multinationals are found to 
be sensitive to national tax burdens, not least because U.S. multinationals operate in a variety of 
tax havens with presumably rather lax enforcement, if any, of anti-profit shifting statutes. Haufler 
and Schjelderup (2000) examine international tax competition in a model where countries can use 
the tax rate and the definition of the tax base as strategic variables. International profit shifting 
can explain a relatively low tax rate and a relatively broad definition of the tax base as Nash 
equilibrium outcomes. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that the profitability reported by 
foreign-owned banks across 80 countries is negatively related to national top statutory tax rates as 
evidence of international profit shifting, while similarly Bartelsman and Beetsman (2003) find 
                                                 
1 Hines and Hubbard (1990), Collins and Shackelford (1992), Froot and Hines (1992) and Grubert (1998) provide 
evidence that multinational financial structure and the pattern of intra-firm interest and other income flows are 
consistent with tax minimization objectives. 
 
  -2-that value added reported at the sectoral level in OECD countries is negatively related to statutory 
tax rates. 
 
In this paper, we present a model of the opportunities and incentives generated by 
international tax differences for international profit shifting by multinationals. Unlike previous 
work (see, for example, HR), we consider not only profit shifting arising from international tax 
differences between affiliates and parent companies, but also profit shifting arising from tax 
differences between affiliates in different host countries. As indicated, multinationals typically 
operate in several countries.  A multinational may carry out substantial business activities in its 
domicile country and, in addition, own subsidiaries in several other countries. In this setting, 
profits can be shifted between the parent firm and a foreign subsidiary, but also between foreign 
subsidiaries. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to offer a framework to describe profit 
shifting in such a multi-country setting. 
 
Our model yields the prediction that a multinational’s profit shifting in a country depends 
on both national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates in all countries 
in which the multinational operates. In particular, we show that profit shifting into a country by a 
multinational is negatively related to a weighted average of international tax rate differences 
between this country and all other countries where the multinational is active. 
 
To implement this framework, we use a unique dataset containing detailed firm-level 
information on the parent companies and subsidiaries of European multinationals from the 
Amadeus database. This database allows us to link each multinational’s parent company to its 
foreign subsidiaries. We complement this dataset with detailed information about the 
international tax system, including data on double taxation provisions in Europe and bilateral tax 
treaties among European countries. We focus on Europe because of the availability of detailed 
data on the structure of European multinationals, including financial statements of not only parent 
companies but also subsidiaries, but also because international tax policy and its impact on 
international profit shifting is a hotly debated topic in Europe, with the European Commission 
(2001) favoring the introduction of a common tax base for multinationals operating in Europe, in 
part to combat international profit shifting in Europe. Nevertheless, our framework can be applied 
to all countries. 
 
Using this unique dataset, we test our model and empirically examine the extent of intra-
European profit shifting by European multinationals. We find that international profit shifting by 
European multinationals is significant, and compare our estimates with those obtained by others 
in the literature. The estimation implies that European firms incur significant costs in shifting 
profits internationally. On average, these costs are estimated to be 1.6 percent of the tax base of 
multinational firms in Europe. 
 
We aggregate our firm-level estimates of profit shifting to arrive at national measures of 
international profit shifting. On average, we find a semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect 
to the top statutory tax rate of 1.43. This elasticity is large enough for international profit shifting 
to be a serious issue for European tax authorities. This is confirmed by estimates of the corporate 
tax revenue losses (or gains) that European governments currently experience on account of 
international profit shifting. We find that Germany has been a large tax revenue loser, both on 
account of its high top statutory tax rate and its large size. Most other European countries in fact 
appear to have experienced net corporate tax revenue gains, at Germany’s expense. 
 
  -3-The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the international 
tax system facing European multinationals. Of particular importance is whether a multinational’s 
foreign-source income is subject to double taxation in both the domicile and foreign countries. 
Section 3 outlines our model of international tax shifting by a multinational firm operating in 
multiple countries. Section 4 discusses the company-level data used in this study. Section 5 
provides the empirical estimates of the impact of the tax regime on international profit shifting 
based on our micro data. Section 6 discusses the macro implications of these empirical estimates. 
First, we present estimates of macro elasticities of reported profits with respect to national tax 
rates and, second, we discuss estimates of the national tax revenue implications of international 
profit shifting by European multinationals. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The international tax system 
 
A multinational firm is domiciled for tax purposes in its parent country and has 
subsidiaries in at least one foreign country. Profit shifting can occur between the parent country 
and one foreign country or between two foreign countries. Such shifts affect the reported pre-tax 
profitability in the two or more affected locales. To see how profit shifting affects the 
multinational’s worldwide tax liability, we generally have to take into account the tax rates of the 
countries involved as well as the rules used by the parent country to alleviate the potential double 
taxation of foreign-source income. To start, the marginal tax rate on income reported in the 
multinational’s parent country is simply equal to the top statutory tax rate in that country, denoted 
tp. In some countries such as Germany, corporate income is taxed at the national as well as the 
sub-national level. In these instances, the top statutory tax rate is calculated to reflect the various 
levels of taxation. Table 1 provides information on top statutory rates in 1999 for the 32 
European countries in our study taken from several sources: Taxation of Companies in Europe 
(International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation), Corporate Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide 
Summaries (PriceWaterhouseCoopers), and Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide (Ernst & Young). 
The notes to Table 1 provide more details on the calculation of the effective tax rates. 
 
  A multinational’s foreign-source income is generally taxed in the foreign country as well 
as in the parent country. To fix ideas, let us consider a multinational, headquartered in country p, 
with a single subsidiary in a foreign country i.  Income reported in the foreign country is first 
taxed in this foreign country at the rates reported in Table 1. The parent country subsequently 
may or may not use its right to tax the income generated abroad.  In case the parent country 
operates a territorial or source-based tax system, it effectively exempts foreign-source income 
from taxation. The effective marginal tax on income reported in country i, denoted τi, in this 
instance equals the statutory tax ti in country i. Alternatively, the parent country operates a 
worldwide or residence-based tax system. In this instance, the parent country subjects income 
reported in country i to taxation, but it generally provides a foreign tax credit for taxes already 
paid in country i to reduce the potential for double taxation.
2 The OECD model treaty, which 
summarizes recommended practice, in fact gives countries an option between an exemption and a 
foreign tax credit as the only two ways to relieve double taxation (see OECD, 1997). The foreign 
tax credit reduces domestic taxes on foreign source income one-for-one with the taxes already 
paid abroad. Foreign tax credits in practice are limited to prevent the domestic tax liability on 
                                                 
2 Firms generally are subject to a set of indirect (non-income) taxes in additional to corporate income taxes. Foreign 
indirect taxes are generally not creditable against a parent company’s corporate income taxes. See Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2004). 
 
  -4-foreign source income from becoming negative. Thus, the multinational will effectively pay no 
additional tax in the parent country, if the parent tax rate, tp, is less than the foreign tax rate, ti. 
The multinational then has unused foreign tax credits and is said to be in an excess credit 
position. Alternatively, the parent tax rate, t , exceeds the foreign tax rate, t p i . In that instance, the 
firm pays tax in the parent country at a rate equal to the difference between the parent and foreign 
country tax rates, i.e. at a rate t - t. The effective, combined tax rate on foreign source income, τ p  i i, 
then equals the parent country tax rate, tp. To summarize, with the credit system the effective rate 
on income generated in country i, τ , is given by max[t t i  p,  i]. A few countries with worldwide 
taxation do not provide foreign tax credits, but instead allow foreign taxes to be deducted from 
the multinational’s taxable income. Under this deduction method, foreign taxes are essentially 
seen as a tax-deductible cost of doing business at par with other business costs. In this scenario, 
one euro of foreign-source income is reduced to (1- t t )(1- p i   ) of net-of-tax income, which implies 
that τi = ti + t (1- t).  p i
 
 and τ   The effective tax rates τi p  as applied to the multinational’s income reported in 
countries i and p determine the tax savings from international profit shifting. Specifically the 
multinational can reduce its worldwide tax liability by τ  - τ p i euro for each euro of profits shifted 
from the parent to the subsidiary if τp  >  τi, and vice versa. In the exemption case, this simply 
requires tp  >  t, and vice versa. i   With the credit system, the firm faces an incentive to shift profits 
from country i to county p if  t   <  t p i , while there is no incentive to shift profits otherwise. With 
the deduction system, finally, there always is an incentive to shift profits from the subsidiary to 
the parent to avoid double taxation. 
 
  Many multinationals have subsidiaries in more than one foreign country.  With 
subsidiaries in n foreign countries, we can distinguish effective tax rates τ and τ i j on income 
reported in foreign countries i and j. The multinational then can reduce its worldwide taxes by 
shifting profits from country i to country j if τ  > τ i j, and vice versa. This would be the case if the 
parent country operates a territorial tax system or a worldwide tax system with a deduction and if  
t  >  t. In case the home country instead provides a foreign tax credit with  t  >  t, we have  τ i  j i  j i   > 
τ if and only if  t  >  t .  j i p
 
  Most countries apply a default method of double tax relief, i.e., exemption, credit, or 
deduction, to the foreign-source income generated by its multinationals. Table 1 reports the 
default method of double tax relief for all European countries in our sample. In individual 
country cases, a different rule may apply as agreed in bilateral tax treaties. To get a complete 
picture of double tax relief methods used in Europe, one thus needs to know (i) a country’s 
default method of double tax relief, and (ii) where a bilateral tax treaty exists that amends the 
general rule. For information on a country’s general rule for dealing with foreign source income, 
we turned to Taxation of Companies in Europe (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation), 
Corporate Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries (PriceWaterhouseCoopers), and Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide (Ernst & Young). Bilateral tax treaties are available from Taxation of 
Companies in Europe (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation), and Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com). Each of these sources of data on tax systems are widely used in the 
literature. 
 
  As seen in Table 2, some countries apply the same double tax relief method to income 
from all other European countries in the table, while other countries apply more than one rule to 
income from different countries. France and the Netherlands, for instance, are countries that 
exempt foreign-source income generated anywhere outside France and the Netherlands, 
  -5-respectively. Italy and the United Kingdom, instead, are countries that generally apply the credit 
method. Belgium is a country that applies the deduction method to some countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia), while it exempts 
foreign source income from other countries. It should be noted that Belgium applies only half of 




3. The model 
 
  The model considers a multinational firm that generally operates establishments in n 
countries. In one of these countries, denoted p, the parent firm is located. The variable Bi 
represents the profits actually generated by the multinational firm in country i. The multinational 
can manipulate its transfer prices for international intra-firm transactions to shift profits Si into 
country i. Manipulating transfer prices is assumed to be costly, as the multinational needs to 
modify its books, and perhaps also its real trade and investment pattern, to be able to justify the 
distorted transfer prices with the tax authorities. Following HR, we assume that the marginal cost 
of shifting profits rises in proportion to the ratio of shifted profits to true profits given by Si/B 
with γ being this factor of proportionality. This reflects that a company’s accounts have to be 
distorted relatively little to accommodate profit shifting S if true profits B i
Bi are relatively large. 








i, incurred by the multinational in country i are calculated as  .   
Total profits shifted by a multinational into its n countries of operation are non-positive so 



































where λ  is a Lagrange multiplier and  i τ  is the effective tax rate. In equation 1, shifting expenses 
are taken to be tax-deductible.  
  The first order condition with respect to S is given by  i
 





γ τ    for all  i =  1,….,n     (2)    0 = λ
 





γ τ − −   Note that the term  in equation 2 is the after-tax, after-marginal-shifting-
cost value of additional profits reported in country i. Equation 2 simply says that this marginal 
                                                 
3 The deduction method as applied by Belgium can be seen as an exemption applied to half of the foreign-source 
income and the standard deduction method applied to the other half. 
 
4 Even if firms comply with transfer pricing regulations, they may face considerable costs in dealing with, for 
instance, documentation requirements. The European Commission (2004a, Table 3-5) reports qualitative survey 
results that indicate that the majority of European multinationals consider these requirements a difficulty. 
  -6-value of reported profits should be equalized across all countries where the multinational firm 
operates. HR use equation 2 to derive an estimating equation relating aggregate profits reported 
by US multinationals in a set of countries to a measure of these countries’ corporate tax rate. In 
the present paper, we use micro-level data on the operations of Europe-based multinational firms 
in many European countries. In this setting, it is necessary to know how a multinational’s 
incentive to shift profits into any one country depends on the tax regimes of all the countries 
where it operates. For this purpose, we proceed to solve equation 2 for the optimal profit shifting 
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where it should be noted that the sum of the   internationally equals zero.  i S
  Equation 3 indicates that the optimal inward profit shifting  is proportional to i) the true 
tax base B
i S












































) 1 ( i τ γ −  and in the weights   reflect that shifting costs are taken to be tax 
deductible in the country where they are incurred, with the tax rate  i τ  in country i  being 
relatively important in the determination of  . At the same time, a higher scaling variable Bk i S B  in 
country k is seen to increase the weight on  i k τ τ −  in the overall expression of  , which reflects 
that a larger scale of operation in country k makes it less costly for the multinational to shift 
profits into or out of this country. Other things equal, optimal profit shifting   into country i 
sensibly increases in the tax rate differences 
i S
i S
i k τ τ − and decreases with the shifting cost parameter 
γ. 
 
  Reported profits, denoted  , are equal to the sum of B
r
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  After taking logs, we can approximate equation (4) to get  
  -7- 
i i
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i C b b
γ
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where  o g =
r
i bl ( )
r
i B ,  o g = i bl ( ) i B , and . The variable  is a 
composite tax variable that summarizes all information about profit shifting incentives (or the 
effective tax rates 
i C
τ  in all countries) and about profit shifting opportunities (or the scale of the 
firm’s operations B in all countries). A positive value of Ci implies that the multinational firm 
























τ 5  .
  The true profit variables BBi are not directly observable. Following HR, we assume that 
true profits are the return to capital in a scenario where capital, K, and labor, L i i, are jointly 
employed by the firm to produce output Qi.  More specifically, we will assume a Cobb-Douglas 
production function given by Q =  . The variable A
i u
i i i e K L cA
ϕ α ε
i i is a productivity parameter that 
may reflect cross-country differences in technology or factor qualities, while ui is a random term. 
True profits, Bi, are equal to output Q minus the wage bill, which gives B = Q - wL i
Bi i i i. . 
B The wage 
wi is taken to be equal to the marginal product of labor given by cα . This implies 
that true profits Bi
i u
i i i e K L A
ϕ α ε − 1
 equal  . Taking logs of this expression for B
i u
i i i e K L A c
ϕ α ε α) 1 ( − , we next get  B B
                                                
i
 
 b  = log (c) + log (1-α) + ε a +α l + φ k + u i i i i i     (6) 
 
where a = log A, l = log L, and k = log (K).  Substituting for b i i i i i i i from (6) into (5), we get the 
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1 ˆ = where β  = log (c) + log (1-α), β  = ε, β  = α, β 1 2 3 4 = φ,  . Equation 7 indicates that logged 
reported profits   respond negatively to the composite tax factor  . In fact, equation 7 suggests 
that we can interpret 
r
i b i C
γˆ as the semi-elasticity of reported profits  with respect to the composite 












i C .  
 As  indicated,  reflects both a multinational’s international structure and the international 
tax system. Tax authorities can affect   and hence reported profits   through changes in 
effective tax rates τ
i C
r
i B i C
. These, as seen in section 2, are determined by the top statutory tax rates t i i 
and by the international pattern of double tax relief. 
 
In practice, double tax relief rules are changed less frequently than tax rates, and hence most of 
the changes in effective tax rates result from changes in statutory tax rates. In this paper, we will 
consider how changes in either effective tax rates τ or in statutory tax rates t i  i affect reported 



































, while at the same time we have   for effective tax 
rate changes in countries k different from i .
6 Next, a general expression for the semi-elasticity of 
























ˆ ˆ 1 τ
τ
γ γ .  This expression reflects that a change in the statutory tax 
rate t in country i may affect reported profits   through its effects on effective tax rates τ
r
i B i k in 
several countries. Hence, quite some information is necessary to assess how a change in a 
country’s statutory tax rate affects the effective tax rates and the Ci facing all multinationals with 
business operations in a country, and in the end how these affect reported profits . Assessments 
of the implications of tax rate changes on international profit shifting are therefore best addressed 
through computer simulation. This is done in section 6. Simulations of this kind require an 
estimated value for the elasticity parameter 
r
i B
γˆ as provided in section 5. 
 
4. The company data 
 
The data on multinational firms is taken from the Amadeus database compiled by Bureau 
Van Dijk.
7 This database provides accounting data on private and publicly owned European firms 


































































































6 Note that , while  . 
7 The database is created by collecting standardized data received from 50 vendors across Europe. The local source 
for this data is generally the office of the Registrar of Companies. 
  -9-as well as on their ownership relationships. These ownership data allow us to match European 
firms with their domestic subsidiaries and subsidiaries located in other European firms. A firm is 
defined to be a subsidiary, if at least 50 percent of the shares are owned by another single firm. 
As we are interested in international profit shifting, we restrict our sample to multinational firms 
that have at least one foreign subsidiary. Multinational firms tend to provide consolidated and 
unconsolidated accounting statements. Consolidated statements reflect the activities within the 
parent companies themselves and of all domestic and foreign subsidiaries. Separate, non-
consolidated statements in contrast reflect the activities directly within the parent firm and in 
each of its subsidiaries. Using non-consolidated statements, we can define the sales of domestic 
multinationals in a country as the sum of the sales of the country’s parent companies and their 
domestic subsidiaries, if any. The sales of foreign multinationals in a country in turn are the sales 
of foreign subsidiaries located domestically. Using this breakdown, Table 3 shows that sales by 
foreign multinationals represent about 23 percent of all sales by multinationals in Europe for 
1999. The table also reports sales data for a smaller sample of multinational firms for which we 
have some basic accounting data beyond sales data. For this smaller sample, the total foreign 
share in sales by multinationals is 22 percent. 
 
  The accounting data in Amadeus are needed to construct the variables used in the 
subsequent empirical analysis. For multinationals with more than one establishment in a country, 
variables are aggregated at the country level. Aggregation of this type does not affect the 
relationships between actual profits, reported profits and taxes in equation 5. This follows from 
the fact that the optimal inward or outward profit shifting by a multinational at the national level 
only depends on true profits at the national level and not on the dispersion of these true profits 
among the multinational’s establishments within countries (as is shown in Appendix 1).
8 Our 
main dependent variable will be the log of earnings before interest and taxes (for definitions of 
variables and data sources, see Appendix 2). Alternatively, we consider the log of pre-tax profits 
defined as earnings net of interest expense but before taxes. As our measure of capital we will use 
the log of fixed assets on the assumption that fixed assets are more easily valued than intangible 
assets. 
 
To represent labor input, we use the labor variable, defined as the log of total labor 
compensation and, alternatively, employment defined as the log of the number of employees. 
Financial leverage is defined as total debt over total assets. On account of the tax deductibility of 
interest expenses, pre-tax profits are expected to be negatively related to financial leverage. 
Earnings before interest and taxes may be affected by leverage as well, if leverage affects 
investment choices and other non-financial aspects of firm performance. 
 
  Table 4 provides summary statistics for the firm-level variables, including the composite 
tax variable C in Panels A through D. Panel A provides these statistics for all firms regardless of 
whether they are domestic or foreign and for all sectors, while Panel B only considers foreign 
subsidiaries. Panels C and D represent all manufacturing firms and foreign subsidiaries in the 
manufacturing sectors only. Comparing Panels A and B, it is interesting to see that on average 
foreign subsidiaries are relatively small in terms of both the income measures and the input 
measures. The same pattern is seen in Panels C and D for manufacturing firms only. As the 
composite tax variable C is a weighted average of bilateral tax differences, it is not surprising that 
the median value of C is zero in all four panels. The mean value of C, however, is negative at -
                                                 
8 With constant returns to scale, production functions can be exactly aggregated. Otherwise, the aggregation 
introduces some additional noise in the estimation of equation 7.  
  -10-0.01 in Panel A and -0.02 in Panels B through D. Given that C is an average of bilateral tax 
differences weighted by sales, this suggests that – for any multinational firm – establishments in 
low-tax countries register relatively low sales. This is to be expected as low-tax countries tend to 
be small countries with small market sizes. 
 
  Next, Panel E of Table 4 provides a correlation matrix for some of the main firm-level 
variables and also per capita income. These correlations are for all establishments, both within 
and across multinational firms. The earnings variable is, not surprisingly, positively related to the 
input measures compensation, employees and capital. All of these are also positively related to 
per capita income, suggesting that firms are larger in richer countries. Finally, the composite tax 
variable,  C, is negatively related to the income and input variables. This suggests that 
multinationals economize on inputs as well as on reported income in high-tax countries. The 
variable  C, finally, is positively related to per capita income. This may reflect that wealthy 
countries tend to have higher corporate income tax rates. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Basic results 
 
  In the basic regressions, the dependent variable is the log of earnings before interest and 
taxes. The benchmark sample is restricted to observations for foreign subsidiaries and thus 
excludes parent companies. We also restrict the base sample to manufacturing firms for which the 
production function approach of equation 6 may describe output better than for, say, service 
industries. We further limit the sample to include only multinational firms for which we have at 
least 20 percent of all (European) subsidiaries in the sample. As robustness checks, we later will 
(i) expand the sample to include parent companies, alternatively (ii) expand the sample to include 
non-manufacturing firms, or (iii) limit the sample to include only firms for which we have at least 
50 percent of all subsidiaries in our sample. In Table 5, regression 1, we see that the sum of the 
coefficients on the labor and capital variables is 0.887. This suggests that overall the technology 
displays decreasing returns to scale. The per capita income variable as a proxy for overall 
economic development enters with a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent 
level. This coefficient reflects the sum effect of several possibly opposite channels by which 
economic development potentially affects profitability. Higher profitability could materialize in 
richer countries on account of more advanced technologies. To the contrary, profitability could 
on average be negatively impacted by the state of development, if firms require higher expected 
returns in poorer countries characterized by less effective property rights and regulations. Our 
finding of a negative coefficient for the per capita income variable suggests that effects of the 
second kind dominate. Finally, the composite tax variable C enters with an estimated coefficient 
γˆ of 1.068 that is significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
γˆ   Regression 2 adds industry fixed effects to the regression to yield an estimated   of 
0.933. As indicated in the table, an F-test of no significance of these industry fixed effects is 
rejected.  Next, regression 3 includes a dummy variable that equals one for firms in Eastern 
Europe and zero for firms in Western Europe, along with an interaction term of this variable with 
the composite tax variable C. The purpose of including these two additional variables is to see 
whether the implied estimated relationship between reported profitability and profit shifting 
incentives, as represented by C, is different in Eastern Europe. This does not seem to be the case, 
as both the Eastern European dummy variable and its interaction term with C, while negative, are 
  -11-not statistically significant. The coefficient for the non-interacted C variable, in contrast, is 
estimated at 0.912 and significant at 1 percent. Finally, in regression 4 we split C into two 
variables for each observation: one variable is the part representing the tax difference of a 
subsidiary vis-à-vis its parent firm and the other is the (weighted) sum of the tax difference vis-à-
vis subsidiaries in other (foreign) countries. The first part – relating to parent firms – obtains a 
coefficient of 1.059 that is significant at the 1 percent level, but the second part – while negative 
– obtains a coefficient that is not statistically significant at 10 percent.
9  
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
 
We next report several alternative regressions as robustness checks taking regression 2 in 
Table 5 as a starting point. First, we compute the composite tax variable C on the assumption that 
the multinational’s ability to shift profits into or out of a country is unrelated to the scale of 
activities in each county. This is achieved by calculating C after setting all the B’s to a constant. 
In Table 6, regression 1, we see that this gives rise to an estimated coefficient γˆ of 0.670 that is 
not statistically significant at 10 percent. Hence, a composite tax variable C only based on tax 
system information does not appear to be able to explain international profit shifting. Next, in 
regression 2 we use assets rather than sales to represent the B’s in the construction of C. This 
would be appropriate, if sales data are too distorted by profit shifting to proxy for a 
multinational’s scale of activities in different locales. This results in an estimated γˆ of 0.854, 
which is very similar to the benchmark estimate of 0.933 in regression 2 of Table 5. In 
regression, 3 we in turn use the log of the number of employees rather than of employee 
compensation to represent labor input. By its very nature, the employment variable fails to reflect 
international differences in labor quality as reflected in international wage differences. The 
estimated value of γˆ is now slightly lower at 0.764. 
 
  So far, our sample has contained only observations on foreign subsidiaries to the 
exclusion of parent companies. This ensures that not all the establishments of any particular 
multinational enter our sample as separate observations. This way we sidestep the potential 
problem that deviations from optimal profit shifting for the various establishments of a given 
multinational as given by equation 3, at least theoretically, add up to zero. The random term ui in 
regression equation 7 in practice, of course, also reflects establishment-specific productivity or 
perhaps demand shocks that would not add up to zero for the overall multinational firm. The 
inclusion of parent firms in regression 4 expands the sample with 476 observations to a total of 
1484, and yields an estimated γˆ of 0.907 very similar to the benchmark estimate of 0.933. 
Regression 5 includes foreign subsidiaries in all industries to yield 2210 observations and an 
estimated γˆ of 0.754. Regression 6 again restricts the simple to manufacturing, but now takes the 
log of pre-tax profits rather than of earnings before interest and taxes as the dependent variable. 
This results in a somewhat smaller estimated γˆ of 0.754. 
 
                                                 
9 However, in an unreported regression we restrict the sample to subsidiaries of multinationals for which we have 
data on at least 50 percent of the subsidiaries to obtain an estimated γˆ of  -1.6 that is statistically significant at 10 
percent. Hence, there is some evidence of international profit shifting among a multinational’s subsidiaries in 
different foreign countries. The absence of strong evidence of profit shifting among a firm’s foreign subsidiaries may 
reflect that these foreign subsidiaries perform similar tasks, e.g. sales, and hence there is little scope for transactions 
among foreign subsidiaries. 
  -12-  In deriving the regression equation 7, we have assumed a uniform shifting cost parameter 
γ for profit shifting into all countries. This assumption implies that we could interact the C 
variable with a set of country dummies to yield similar coefficients for γˆ. Regression 7 in fact 
replaces a single C variable by a set of interaction terms of C with country dummies, while the 
country dummies themselves are included as well. For some countries, there are rather few 
subsidiary observations. Therefore, coefficients for individual country interaction terms are not 
expected to be estimated with precision, and indeed the (unreported) coefficients for the 
interaction terms vary widely. The table, however, reports an F-test of the hypothesis that all 
coefficients on the interaction terms are equal, which is not rejected. 
 
  Next, in regressions 8 we restrict the sample to subsidiaries of multinationals for which 
we have complete data on at least 50 percent of the (European) foreign subsidiaries. This reduces 
the sample size to 354 observations, and increases the estimated coefficient of γˆ to 1.949. In 
regression 9, we include leverage as an additional explanatory variable. Leverage enters the 
regression with a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, 
leverage appears to reduce reported earnings before earnings and taxes, perhaps because it makes 
profitable investments more difficult to finance, whileγˆ is estimated at 0.792. Regression 10 also 
includes the leverage variable and, as regression 6, has the log of pre-tax earnings after interest 
but before taxes as the dependent variable. Leverage has a more negative impact on pre-tax 
profits than on pre-tax earnings, no doubt on account of the tax deductibility of interest expenses. 
Relative to equation 6, the inclusion of the leverage variable reduces the estimated γˆ to 0.656. 
Regression 11 adds the Corruption variable constructed by ICRG (with higher values denoting 
less corruption) to see whether less corruption would lead to higher reported earnings. Indeed the 
Corruption variable enters the regression with a positive coefficient, but it is not statistically 
significant. 
 
  To construct our effective tax rate variable, we consulted the entire grid of Europe’s 
bilateral tax treaties for information on double taxation relief rules. Davies (2004) explains that 
tax treaties may affect international transfer pricing in other ways as well. First, tax treaties in 
some instances specify the preferred method of transfer price calculation to be used by firms, 
which would eliminate firms’ discretion in this area and presumably the scope for international 
profit shifting through transfer price manipulation. Secondly, tax treaties may specify the dispute 
resolution mechanisms to be followed in case different national tax authorities disagree on 
international transfer prices. This is expected to weaken the position of the firm in any dispute on 
transfer pricing and may similarly make transfer price manipulation more difficult. To test this, in 
regression 12 we include a treaty dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a subsidiary 
country has concluded a bilateral tax treaty with the firm’s parent country, and a value of zero 
otherwise. Information on whether a bilateral tax treaty exists has been collected from Tax 
Analysts (www.taxanalysts.com) and is reproduced in Appendix 3. The treaty variable enters 
regression 12 with a negative coefficient that is statistically insignificant. Blonigen and Davies 
(2002) similarly fail to find a significant effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI. 
 
Finally, regression 13 restricts the sample to subsidiary observations in Western Europe 
on the assumption that reported profitability in Western Europe may be depressed relatively little 
by tax or other fraud not related to transfer prices. This reduces the sample to 906 observations to 
yield an estimated γˆ to 0.908 close to the benchmark estimate of 0.933. 
  -13-5.3 Comparison with Hines and Rice (1994) 
 
  The work by HR implies a semi-elasticity of reported pre-tax profits with respect to the 
tax rate of 2.83 based on regression 1 in their Table II. This figure is much larger than our 
benchmark estimate of 0.933 of the elasticity of reported pre-tax profits with respect to the 
composite tax variable C. The two numbers, clearly enough, are not directly comparable as the 
HR study and our study differ in several important ways. First, HR examine the profits reported 
by US multinationals on their FDI in other countries including in set of tax havens. The present 
study instead examines the profits reported by European multinationals within Europe to exclude 
most of the countries considered tax havens in the HR study.
10 Second, the sample periods in the 
two studies differ, as HR and the present study use data for 1982 and 1999, respectively. Third, 
HR use aggregate FDI data, while we have firm-level micro data on FDI. Related to this, HR 
construct a tax rate on the basis of aggregate tax accounting data, while our tax variable C is 
based on statutory tax information. The use of tax accounting data by HR also prevents them 
from distinguishing between the cases where US multinationals would or would not be in an 
excess credit position with regard to their corporate income taxes in the US. This distinction, of 
course, would not matter if US multinationals in practice can defer US taxation on a substantial 
part of their foreign-source income. By focusing on effective tax rates that reflect double tax 
relief rules, the C variable makes a distinction between excess and no excess credit positions 
experienced by multinationals based in a country. 
 
  In this section, we examine what explains the difference in results between the two 
studies. To do this, we first estimate a semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the tax 
rate with our data in a way closely resembling the approach in HR. This helps to see whether 
differences in the approach or in the samples are the main explanation behind the different 
estimated coefficients. Next, we estimate a series of regressions that one step at a time modify the 
HR approach to more closely resemble the approach of this paper. The purpose of this is to see 
which of the stated methodological differences are important in explaining the difference in 
estimated coefficients. 
 
  To start, we use our micro-level data from Amadeus to construct aggregate profitability, 
tax rate and capital and labor input variables as used in the HR study. Our aggregate tax rate thus 
is calculated as taxes paid divided by total pre-tax profits. As we examine FDI in a grid of 
countries rather than from a single sending country, our tax variable will be the difference in the 
average tax rates in the subsidiary and parent countries. Other variables are constructed on a 
bilateral basis as well. As seen in Table 7, regression 1, the semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits with 
respect to the difference in average tax rates in estimated to be 1.421. This figure is about half the 
mentioned HR estimate of 2.83. This suggests that profit-shifting in the current sample of 
European multinationals is less pronounced than profit shifting in the sample of US 
multinationals in the HR study, perhaps because the HR study includes many tax haven countries. 
 
  Firms with negative profits tend to pay zero taxes. Such firms clearly depress aggregate 
profit figures and hence may lead to an overly high calculated average tax rate. To see whether 
this matters, we next calculate aggregate bilateral data, including average tax rates, after 
excluding subsidiaries that report negative profits. The resulting regression 2 reports a somewhat 
                                                 
10 Of the countries listed in Table 1, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland are labeled tax havens in HR.  
  -14-11 smaller estimate of 1.222 of the tax semi-elasticity.  Regressions 3 and 4 are based on the same 
data as regressions 1 and 2, but they use individual firm data rather than aggregate data. This 
gives rise to somewhat smaller estimated semi-elasticities of 0.528 and 1.016, respectively. The 
step from aggregate to firm-level data apparently may account for part of the difference in the 
estimated coefficients in the HR and the present study. As a next step, we replace the difference 
of the accounting-based, average based tax rates by the difference of top statutory tax rates 
yielding an estimated semi-elasticity of 1.229 in regression 5. Thus replacing average tax rates by 
statutory tax rates matters little for the estimated semi-elasticity. 
 
  To proceed, we replace the bilateral difference of the statutory tax rates by the difference 
of effective tax rates. This implies that we adjust the statutory tax rates for any double tax relief 
offered by the parent country in case this country taxes the multinational firm’s profits on a 
worldwide basis. As before, the effective tax rate in the parent country is set equal to the top 
statutory tax rate in the parent country. This results in a very similar estimated semi-elasticity of 
1.199 in regression 6. Hence, adjusting tax rates for double tax relief in the form of deductions or 
foreign tax credits appears to make little difference in the estimated value of the semi-elasticity. 
Next, in regressions 7 and 8 we take the tax variables of regressions 5 and 6 and divide them by 
one minus the effective tax rate of the parent country. This brings the tax variable closer to the 
definition of the composite tax variable C. This division by a variable less then unity naturally 
leads to smaller estimated coefficients at 0.654 and 0.624 in regressions 7 and 8. Finally, in 
column 9 we reproduce the benchmark regression of Table 5, regression 2 that includes C as an 
explanatory variable. This again leads to a larger semi-elasticity of 0.933, perhaps because the C 
variable weights bilateral tax differences by the scale of the multinational’s activities in different 
countries. Unlike the HR study, our framework – with the composite tax term C as an 
explanatory variable – does not directly yield an estimated semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits with 
respect to actual tax rates. However, a semi-elasticity with respect to actual tax rates is implied in 
the estimation. We return to this issue in section 6. 
    
5.4 Endogeneity of tax policy 
 
  So far we have assumed that tax policy is exogenous to reported pre-tax profits. In 
practice, however, tax policy may to some extent be endogenous. To see this, note that firms and 
also countries may differ in whether they can generate rents through the exploitation of natural 
resources or perhaps better access to consumer markets. Rents would register as higher reported 
pre-tax profits and, at the same time, warrant higher levels of taxation if these rents are 
internationally immobile. Hence, higher pre-tax profits could give rise to higher tax levels. 
Similarly, reported pre-tax profits may be relatively high in countries that provide relatively 
plentiful public inputs to production in the form of, say, high-quality infrastructure. To finance 
extensive public inputs, countries may need to levy relatively high corporate income taxes. 
Again, higher pre-tax profits would endogenously be associated with higher corporate tax 
burdens. Such endogeneity is expected to lead to a downward bias of the OLS estimate of γˆ. 
 
  To correct for this and following HR, this section presents instrumental variables 
estimates of γˆ, where we take the size of the country, as proxied by its population, as an 
                                                 
11 Paradoxically, excluding loss making subsidiaries enlarges the sample of regression 2 relative to regression 1. The 
exclusion of firms with negative profits apparently leads to more observations where aggregate profits (on a bilateral 
basis) are positive. 
 
  -15-instrument for the corporate tax burden. This reflects the notion that on account of international 
tax competition smaller countries tend to levy lower corporate income taxes.
12 To implement 
this, we first regress the top statutory tax rate on the log of total population to obtain a predicted 
value of the top statutory tax rate. We next use these predicted values rather than the actual ones 
to construct the composite tax variable C. By its very nature, this approach uses bilateral 
information on double tax relief rules and in fact takes this information to be exogenous. This 
may be a reasonable assumption as double taxation relief rules tend to be longstanding. The result 
is an estimated γˆ of 1.682 in regression 1 of Table 8. This estimate is higher than our benchmark 
estimate of 0.933 in Table 5, regression 2, which suggests that the OLS estimate of γˆ is indeed 
biased downward.  Next, in regression 2 we use the difference of the logs of the populations of 
the subsidiary and parent countries to instrument for the overall variable C. This approach implies 
that the overall tax variable C, in part reflecting double taxation relief conventions, is taken to be 
endogenous.
13 γˆ  Now we find an estimated   of 2.032 in regression 2. In regression 3, we exclude 
subsidiaries of multinational firms for which we have incomplete data for more than half of 
European subsidiaries from regression 2. The estimated γˆ of 2.238 is very similar to the estimate 
of 2.032 in regression 2. In the remainder of this paper, we take the estimated γˆ of 2.032 in 
regression 2 as our preferred estimate, as the results of this section suggest that endogeneity of 
tax policy is a relevant issue. 
 
6. Interpretation of results 
 
Our estimates of the semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits with respect to the composite tax 
variable C by themselves suggest that reported pre-tax profits in Europe reflect tax rates. The 
variable C, however, is not a direct tax policy variable. Therefore it is useful to see what our 
regression estimates imply about the semi-elasticities of reported pre-tax profits with respect to 
actual tax rates as considered in subsection 6.1.  Next, subsection 6.2 provides estimates of how 
national tax revenues are currently affected by the implied degree of international profit shifting. 
 
6.1 Implied elasticities of aggregate reported profits with respect to tax rates 
 
Aggregate international profit shifting experienced by a country is the simple sum of the 
profit shifting by all the multinationals operating within its territory. To arrive at an estimate of 
aggregate profit shifting in response to, say, a change in the top statutory tax rate, we thus first 
need to estimate how profit shifting by each and every multinational is affected by the tax policy 
change. Profit shifting by any multinational depends, as seen in section 3, on its own particular 
structure as well as on the tax incentives it faces. More specifically, estimated changes in reported 
profits per firm in country i in response to a change in the effective or the top statutory tax rate in 
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12 Huizinga (1987) finds that corporate tax rates are positively correlated with country populations. 
13 Bond and Samuelson (1989) and Mintz and Tulkens (1996) consider the choice of different double taxation relief 
conventions. 
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  Table 9 reports our simulated semi-elasticities of reported pre-tax profits w.r.t the 
effective and statutory tax rates.  In column 1, we see that Germany is estimated to have the 
lowest semi-elasticities of pre-tax profits with respect to the effective tax rate of 0.32. This low 
estimate may reflect Germany’s high statutory tax rate and the fact that multinational-firm 
establishments in Germany may be relatively large, which makes (marginal) shifts of profits out 
of Germany relatively hard. Other large European countries, and in particular France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Spain, similarly obtain relatively low semi-elasticities with respect to 
effective tax rates (all below the average of 1.74 for all European countries). Next, in column 2 
we report national semi-elasticities with respect to statutory tax rates. As discussed in section 3, a 
change in the statutory tax rate in one country may or may not affect the effective tax rate in that 
country and in other countries depending on the pertinent double tax relief rule and the statutory 
tax rates in other countries. In the simplest (theoretical) case, all countries operate exemption 
systems and changes in national effective tax rates mimic changes in national statutory tax rates. 
In that instance, the two simulated semi-elasticities should be the same as well. In practice, we 
see that for some countries in the table that apply exemptions (to at least some foreign countries) 
the two simulated elasticities are indeed equal. These countries are Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and the Slovak Republic. Note, however, that these simulated 
elasticities are a reflection of the international tax system as well as of the actual patterns of 
European multinational investment as revealed by our data set. For all other countries in the table, 
the estimated semi-elasticity with respect to the statutory rate is less then the semi-estimated 
elasticity with respect to the effective rate. This is the case, for instance, with the UK where the 
two elasticities are reported to be 1.13 and 1.10, respectively. This can be explained by the fact 
that the UK operates a credit system, while some UK multinationals operate subsidiaries in 
countries with a lower statutory tax rate than the UK (at 30 percent, as seen in Table 1). A higher 
statutory tax rate in the UK then does not affect incentives for UK multinationals to shift profits 
to these low-tax countries (in fact, the tax incentive remains zero). This reduces the aggregate 
semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the statutory rate in the UK below the analogous 
semi-elasticity with respect to the effective tax rate. 
 
  Next, we report separate national aggregate profit semi-elasticities for the groups of 
parent companies and foreign subsidiaries in any particular country.  The semi-elasticities with 
respect to the two tax rates for parent firms are reported in columns 3 and 4, while the two semi-
elasticities for foreign subsidiaries are reported in columns 5 and 6. Semi-elasticities reported for 
parent firms tend to be smaller for the foreign subsidiaries. Comparing columns 3 and 5, for 
instance, we see that the semi-elasticities with respect to effective tax rates are smaller for parent 
firms than foreign subsidiaries in all countries (for which we have figures) apart from Belgium 
and Hungary. An explanation may be that parent firms tend to be larger than foreign subsidiaries 
so that reported profit shifts between a parent firm and a foreign subsidiary imply small relative 
profit shifting for the parent firm. 
 
  -17-  Semi-elasticities can in principle be used to calculate the rate that maximizes tax revenues 
(in fact, the revenue-maximizing tax rate is simply the inverse of the relevant semi-elasticity). 
Based on the European average semi-elasticities of 1.74 and 1.43 for the two tax rates for all 
firms, this would yield revenue maximizing effective and statutory tax rates of 0.58 and 0.70, 
respectively. These numbers, however, have to be interpreted with caution. First, by construction 
our profit shifting elasticities indicate how reported profits change for given inputs of capital and 
labor. In practice, of course, inputs are affected by tax policy, especially at higher rates, and thus 
revenue maximizing tax rates are likely to be lower.
14  
 
6.2 Implications of current profit shifting for national tax revenues 
 
  In this subsection, we provide estimates of current levels of profit shifting in Europe and 
their tax revenue implications for European treasuries. To do so, we compare the outcome with 
profit shifting to the hypothetical outcome without profit shifting that materializes if profit 
shifting expenses are prohibitively high, say on account of perfect tax enforcement. Within our 
model, the latter case obtains if we let the shifting cost parameter γ go to infinity.
15 The 
composite tax variable, C, the profit shifting variable, S, and profit shifting expenses, E i i i, then all 
collapse to zero. Estimates of S and E i i in case of profit shifting along with information on the 
international tax system can be used to estimate how national tax revenues are affected by 
international profit shifting. 
 
  To proceed, first note that equation 5 can be written as   from which we 
can solve for true profits  as 
i i i
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incurred by shifting profits into country i by a firm can be estimated by  . 
Individual firm estimates of   can next be used to construct aggregate measures of international 
profit shifting by all multinationals. To wit, let
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ij S  be the aggregate profit shifting into country i 
by multinationals domiciled in country j. Aggregating this over countries j, we subsequently get 
i S , or the total profit shifting into country i by multinationals domiciled anywhere. Adding 
aggregate inward profit shifting
r
i B i S  to the aggregate reported pre-tax profits,  , we arrive at an 
estimate of the true aggregate pre-tax profits  ij E i B . Similarly,   is defined as the total profit 
shifting expense incurred in country i by multinationals domiciled in country j, while  i E  is the 
total profit shifting expense in country i incurred by multinationals domiciled anywhere. 
 
                                                 
14 Even within our framework, our estimated semi-elasticities are local semi-elasticities that themselves can vary 
with the tax rate. To see this, we can again take the example of a multinational firm with a parent firm in a credit 
country, such as the UK, with a single foreign subsidiary. Theoretically, the semi-elasticity of reported profits in the 
subsidiary country is zero, as long as the subsidiary-country tax rate is below the parent-country tax rate. Increasing 
the subsidiary-country tax rate, however, at some point makes both countries’ tax taxes equal to render the semi-
elasticity of reported profits with respect to the statutory tax rate in the subsidiary country positive. 
15 Alternatively profit shifting would be eliminated following tax rate harmonization in which case tax revenues also 
change on account of tax rate changes. 
  -18-  The implications of the revealed aggregate international profit shifting for national 
corporate tax revenues depend on the intricacies of the international tax system, and in particular 
on whether countries tax profits on a territorial or a worldwide basis and, in the latter case, 
whether a credit or a deduction is provided to alleviate double taxation. To start, let  be the 
change in tax revenues for an exemption country i compared to a world without international 
profit shifting (but with the same tax policies). This change is given by 
e
i T Δ
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calculate   we thus need to know a substantial part of the overall bilateral profit shifting grid 
c
i T Δ
ji S . In the deduction case, finally, the change in tax revenues  is given by 
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  Table 10 gives estimates of profit shifting at the national level. The country with the 
highest statutory tax rate in the sample, Germany, operates an exemption system, and therefore 
can only experience outward profit shifting, and indeed the ratio of inward profit shifting to the 
true tax base, 
17
i i B S / , is estimated to be –0.274 for Germany.  At the other extreme, the country 
with the lowest statutory tax rate, Hungary, is expected to mostly experience inward profit 
shifting, and indeed the same ratio is 0.339 for Hungary.
18 All other countries may 
simultaneously experience significant outward and inward profit shifting. For these countries, 
actual aggregate profit shifting depends as much on the actual pattern on European multinational 
investment as on the size of the national statutory tax rate vis-à-vis other countries. In the table, 
we see that most countries on net experience inward profit shifting (with a positive i S ). Only 
Germany, as already mentioned, and Italy and Romania experience net outward profit shifting. 
The predominance of inward profit shifting across Europe no doubt reflects the dominant position 
of Germany as the country with the highest statutory tax rate and the largest multinational activity 
(as measured, for instance, by sales in Table 3). Thus even a country such as France with a 
relatively high statutory tax rate of 40 percent on net receives inward profit shifting (albeit small 
in relative terms, with  i i B S / = 0.004), as Europe’s main economy, i.e. Germany, has an even 
higher tax rate of almost 54 percent. 
 
  As seen in Table 10, countries that experience significant outward or inward profit 
shifting relative to the tax base  i i B S / i i B E / also incur high relative profit shifting expenses  . On 
average, profit shifting expenses are 1.6 percent of the tax base of multinational firms in Europe. 
Finally, the estimated tax revenue implications in the table reflect the revealed pattern of 
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16 Note that for the Belgian deduction case, we have  . 
032 . 2 / ) / ( i i B S
17 Note that   is an estimate of the marginal profit shifting expense (weighted by the tax base). For 
Germany, for instance, the marginal expense of shifting profits inward is calculated to be negative at -0.135. 
18 Note that a multinational domiciled in a deduction country would face an incentive to shift profits out of Hungary 
despite its low tax rate. 
  -19-international profit shifting as well as profit shifting expenses. All European countries in fact are 
estimated to gain tax revenues on account of international profit shifting, apart from Germany, 
Italy and Romania. Note that the tax revenue losses by Germany, Italy and Romania together are 
estimated to exceed the tax revenue gains by all the other countries. This is to be expected as 






Europe’s firms are increasingly multinational following the creation of a single market in 
the EU and the introduction of the euro. At the same time, multinational firms continue to report 
taxable profits separately in each European country where they have a permanent establishment. 
European multinationals, typically active in several countries, have many opportunities to re-
allocate profits internationally, while significant international tax rate differences provide 
powerful incentives to actually do this. Our theoretical framework suggests that the international 
profit shifting by an individual multinational firm depends on its international structure and on 
the international tax regime it faces in each of the countries it operates. Using a unique dataset of 
European multinational firms and tax regimes, we find evidence in support of significant profit 
shifting. Using our estimates, we compute aggregate semi-elasticities of reported profits with 
respect to tax rates. The average semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top 
statutory tax rate is estimated to be 1.43, which is substantial. The costs of international profit 
shifting appear to be considerable, and profit shifting leads to a significant redistribution of 
national corporate tax revenues in Europe. Germany, with the highest tax rate in 1999 and the 
largest economy, appears to have lost considerable tax revenues on account of international profit 
shifting. Most other countries may on net have gained some corporate tax revenues – at 
Germany’s expense. 
 
  The proclivity of multinationals to shift profits so as to reduce their worldwide tax bill 
provides countries with the incentive to reduce their top statutory tax rate – to reduce outward 
profit shifting and perhaps to attract some inward profit shifting. Many European countries have 
indeed started to lower their top statutory tax rates in recent years. For the EU-15, the average top 
statutory tax rate declined from 38.0 percent in 1995 to 31.4 percent in 2004 (as documented by 
European Commission, 2004b). Notably, Germany lowered its federal tax rate in 2001 to 25 
percent. This tax rate slashing has been accompanied by base-broadening reforms so as to leave 
the effective marginal tax rate on investment fairly stable (see Devereux et al., 2002). 
 
  The root cause of international profit shifting in Europe is the system of separate, national 
bookkeeping and tax bases. The introduction of a common tax base for multinational firms in 
Europe would eliminate all potential for international profit shifting – at least within Europe. 
 
                                                 
19 At the same time, the profits shifted out of Germany, Italy and Romania are estimated to exceed the profits shifted 
into all the other countries. Taken at face value, this finding contradicts the model of section 3, which suggests that 
worldwide shifts in profits should add up to zero. However, one should note that the profit shifting estimates are 
calculated on the basis of a sample that does not include all parent companies and subsidiaries because data are 
lacking for firms that do not report independent unconsolidated statements and for subsidiaries located outside of 
Europe. For the subset of European firms included in our analysis, aggregate profit shifting is therefore unlikely to 
exactly add up to zero.  
 
  -20-However, until such a system has been put in place, the evidence of this paper suggests that 
international profit shifting in Europe will continue to generate massive redistributions of 
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  -23-Table 1.  Corporate tax rates on domestic income in 1999 
 
This table reports top statutory tax rates taking into account subnational corporate income taxes 
where applicable and the base rule applied by each country for avoidance of double taxation on 
foreign income. All data are as of end 1999. Sources: Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation; Corporate Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide 




Default method of double 
tax relief  Country 
Austria   34  Exemption (j) 
Belgium   40.17 (a)  Foreign tax deduction (k) 
Bulgaria   34.30 (b)  Foreign tax credit 
Croatia   35  Foreign tax credit 
Cyprus 25  Foreign  tax  credit 
Czech 
Republic   35  Foreign tax credit 
Denmark   32  Foreign tax credit 
Estonia   26  Foreign tax credit 
Finland   28  Foreign tax credit 
France   40 (c)  Exemption 
Germany   53.76 (d)  Foreign tax credit 
Greece   40  Foreign tax credit 
Hungary   18  Foreign tax credit 
Iceland   30  Foreign tax credit 
Ireland   28  Foreign tax deduction 
Italy   41.25 (e)  Foreign tax credit 
Latvia   25  Foreign tax credit 
Liechtenstei
n  15  No relief (l) 
Lithuania   29  Foreign tax credit 
Luxembourg  37.45 (f)  Foreign tax credit 
Malta   35  Foreign tax credit 
Netherlands 35  Exemption 
Norway   28  Foreign tax credit 
Poland   34  Foreign tax credit 
Portugal   37.4 (g)  Foreign tax credit 
Romania   38  Foreign tax credit 
Slovak 
Republic   40  Foreign tax credit 
Slovenia   25  Foreign tax credit 
Spain   35  Foreign tax credit 
Sweden   28  Foreign tax credit 
Switzerland 33.19  (i)  Exemption 
United 
Kingdom   30  Foreign tax credit 
   
Average 34.44   
  -24-Notes: 
(a) The corporate income tax rate in Belgium is 39%. This rate is increased by a 3% crisis tax 
levied on the 39%, which leads to a total corporate tax rate of 40.17%. 
 
(b) In addition to the basic corporate tax of 27%, there is a municipal tax of 10% of the taxable 
profit. The taxable base for the corporate income tax is reduced by the municipalities tax paid 
(i.e., the municipal tax is a deductible expense for profit tax purposes).  The total  tax rate is 
therefore 34.3%. 
 
(c) The total tax rate on corporate income of 40% includes a base rate of 33.33%, plus two 
surtaxes equal to 10% each of the base corporate tax rate. 
 
(d) German business profits are subject to two taxes, corporation tax and municipal trade tax. 
Corporation tax is levied under a split-rate imputation system at the following rates: 30% on 
profits distributed to stockholders and 40% on undistributed profits. Branches of foreign 
corporations: 40% on total profits. The total amount of corporation tax due is subject to a 
surcharge of 5.5% (the “solidarity levy”). The total tax rate of the municipal trade tax varies by 
location from just under 12% to 20.5% (around 20% for most larger cities). This tax is deductible 
as an expense for corporation tax. The total income tax rate, which includes corporation tax and 
municipal trade tax is 53.76%. In the calculation of the total income tax rate we assume a trade 
tax of 20% (the average for large cities) and zero distributed profits. 
 
(e) This includes a local (regional) tax on productive activities (IRAP) on Italian-source income. 
 
(f) The base corporate income tax rate is 30%. A solidarity tax of 4% of the above tax is levied. 
In addition, a municipal tax on income is levied at a rate of between rate of 7.46% and 12.31%, 
depending on the commune in which the undertaking is located (the municipal tax is 10% in 
Luxembourg City). The municipal tax is deductible as an expense from its own, as well as from 
the corporate income tax basis. The total income tax rate, which includes income tax and 
municipal business tax, is therefore between 36.29% and 39.65% (37.45% for Luxembourg City). 
We use the rate for Luxembourg City. 
 
(g) The base corporate tax rate in Portugal is 34%, which increases to 37.4% in almost all cases 
by a municipal surcharge (derrama) of 10%. 
 
(i) The Swiss Federation levies direct federal income tax at a flat rate of 8.5% on profits after tax. 
In addition, each canton has its own tax law and levies cantonal and communal income taxes at 
different rates. Therefore, the tax burden of income (and capital) varies from canton to canton. 
Cantonal and communal taxes are generally imposed at progressive rates, based on the ratio of 
profit to capital and reserves. As a general rule, the approximate range of the maximum total 
income tax rate on profit for federal, cantonal, and communal taxes is between 14.42% and 
44.98%, depending on the company’s profitability and place of residence. Taxes are treated as 
tax-deductible expenses, so that the maximum total tax rate varies between 12.6% and 31.02%. 
For Geneva, the Federal tax is 8.5% and the Cantonal tax is 23.39%, thus the total is 31.89%. In 
Zurich, the Federal tax rate is 8.5% and the cantonal tax rate is 24.69% for the model firm (in the 
example provided in PWC’s Corporate Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries), hence the total 
is 33.19%. We take the rate for Zurich. 
 
  -25-(j) Provided foreign source income has been subject to at least a 15% tax rate in the source 
country; otherwise, the rule applied is a foreign tax credit. 
 
(k) Belgium applies only half of its normal tax rate to any foreign-source income (after deduction 
of foreign taxes). Hence, the deduction method as applied by Belgium can be seen as an 
exemption applied to half of the foreign-source income and the standard deduction method 
applied to the other half. 
 
(l) Liechtenstein has no tax on foreign source income. 
 
  -26-  -27-
Table 2.  Bilateral international double taxation alleviation 
 
E=Exemption, C=Credit ,D=Deduction, BD=Belgian Deduction. Rule applies to income received 
by parent firm in country in left column from subsidiary in country in top row. For example, 
income received by a parent firm in France is exempted from income in France regardless of its 
foreign origin. 
 
Sources: Taxation of Companies in Europe, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation; Tax 
Analysts (www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, Ernst & Young. 






























































































































































































































































































Austria E E E E E E E E E E E E E C C E E E E E E E E E E E C E C
Belgi u m     E     E  E  E   B D   E   B D EEEEE EE EEEEEE EEEE B D B D   B D   B D B D
Bulga r i a     E  E     C  C  C  E  CEEEEE CE EEEEEE EEEE
CCEECCCCEC CEECCCCCCECE
C CC   EC
C r o a t i a    C  E  C     E  E  E   C  






Czech  E  C  C  E  E  E  C C E E E C C C E C C  E E E C E C C C E E E E
D e n m a r k   E  C  C  C  C  C     C  
E s t o n i a    C  C  C  C  C  C  C   E  
F i n l a n d    E  C  C  C  C  C  C   C  
F r a n c e    E  E  E  E  E  E  E   E  
Germany  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  EEE EEEEEE EEEEECEEEEEE
CCCC CCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCC
E  
Greece   E C C C C C C  C  
Hungary  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  CEEEE CEEC EEEEEEEEEEEE
EEEECC CCE CEECCCCCCEEE
CCCC C CC CCCCC C CCCC
C  
I c e l a n d    C  C  C  C  C  C  E   E  
I r e l a n d    C  C  D  D  C  C  C   D D C   D D




C C C   C C
L a t v i a     C  C  C  C  C  C  C   E  
L i t h u a nC  C  C  C  C  C  C    
L u x e m E  E  E  C  C  E  E   C  
Netherla E  E  E  E  E  E  E  EEEEEEEEEE E EEEEEEEEEE E  
Norway    C  E  E  E  C  C  C  CCCECCCEEC CC CECCECCEC
ECEEEECEEE ECE EEEEECEE
C  
P o l a n d    E  E  E  E  E  E  C   E  
Portuga l    
a




R o m a n i  
k
E  E  E  E  C  C  C   C  
S l o v a   E  C  C  C  E  C  E   C  
Slovenia  C C C C E C E C C E E C E C C E C C C E E C C E E C E C E





S w e d e n    
r l
C  C  E  E  E  C  C   C  
S w i t z e E  E  E  E  E  E  E   E  
U n i t e d   C  C  C  C  C  C  C   C    -29-
 
Table 3.  Sample of multinational firms in Amadeus 
 
Sales are in billions of US dollars. Foreign to total sales is the ratio of sales to foreign 
subsidiaries and total sales. Firms with basic accounting data are firms with data on total assets, 
fixed assets, sales, labor compensation, pre-tax profits, taxes and the number of employees. Data 
are from Amadeus. 
 
  Firms with at least one foreign subsidiary 
Firms with at least one foreign subsidiary 




























Austria 18.40 223  11.50 223 0.38 8.56 61  4.04 109 0.32
Belgium 58.30 1053  39.00 618 0.40 53.70 830 24.40 426 0.31
Bulgaria 0.07 6  0.00 2 0.07 0.07 6 0.00 2 0.07
Croatia 0 0  0.07 1 1.00 0 0 0 0
Czech 
Republic 2.05 38  0.05 5 0.02 2.05 38 0.01 2 0.00
Denmark 27.20 354  15.10 468 0.36 27.00 288 12.80 333 0.32
Estonia 0.01 2  0.00 1 0.13 0.01 2 0.00 1 0.13
Finland 64.70 593  24.10 488 0.27 57.60 436 22.20 359 0.28
France 395.00 4247  95.00 1695 0.19 349.00 3419 77.50 1151 0.18
Germany 510.00 1453  78.50 992 0.13 402.00 339 65.00 768 0.14
Greece 5.18 198  0.06 33 0.01 0 0 0.06 29 1.00
Hungary 1.23 32  0.11 17 0.08 0.27 11 0.07 13 0.20
Ireland 0.91 19  3.20 84 0.78 0 0 2.87 65 1.00
Italy 92.60 414  16.80 194 0.15 92.30 387 13.30 139 0.13
Luxembourg 3.20 23 2.48 65 0.44 1.83 18 2.29 40 0.56
Netherlands 1.74 56  50.30 704 0.97 1.38 12 40.70 493 0.97
Norway 27.40 786  9.50 312 0.26 20.40 579 8.33 228 0.29
Poland 7.71 108  0.41 9 0.05 2.80 47 0.41 8 0.13
Portugal 0.13 11  6.99 15 0.98 0.03 3 6.96 12 1.00
Slovenia 2.73 27  0.12 8 0.04 0 0 0.04 4 1.00
Slovak 
Republic 1.46 2  0.02 3 0.01 0.07 1 0.01 2 0.14
Spain 177.00 751  10.30 172 0.05 175.00 649 6.20 120 0.03
Sweden 126.00 2846  44.00 984 0.26 121.00 2139 39.10 713 0.24
Switzerland 16.10 156  40.60 711 0.72 1.09 5 36.00 450 0.97
United 
Kingdom  293.00 2552 86.90 1365 0.23 247.00 1753 76.40 922 0.24
Total 1830.00 15955  535.00 9171 0.23 1560.00 11023 439.00 6390 0.22Table 4.  Summary statistics 
 
Pre-tax earnings is the logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes. Pre-tax profit is the log of 
earnings before taxes. Capital is the log of the amount of fixed assets.  Labor is the log of total 
labor compensation. Employees is the log of the number of employees. Our sample consists of 
the parent company and all foreign subsidiaries for all firms that have at least one subsidiary in a 
European country other than the country where the parent company is located and for which basic 
accounting data are available (earnings, sales, capital, and labor). For each firm, we aggregate all 
establishments located in one country (i.e., all subsidiaries and the parent company, if applicable) 
to one observation. Hence, each observation represents the total business operation of a particular 
multinational firm in a given country. In panel B we restrict the sample to foreign subsidiaries 
only. In panels C and D and the remainder of the tables, we restrict the sample to manufacturing 
companies only (NACE industry codes 15 to 40). Data are from Amadeus. 
 
Panel A: All firms 





Pre-tax earnings  7.75 7.68 2.50 -3.88 15.77  3302
Pre-tax profit  7.51 7.46 2.56 -4.12 15.53  3036
Capital 8.72 8.85 3.14 -1.84 17.81  3302
Labor 8.61 8.61 2.20 1.20 16.24  3302
Employees 4.99 5.00 2.15 0.00 12.11  3302
Financial leverage  0.62 0.64 0.33 -6.10 4.77  3302
C -0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.43 0.53  3302
 
Panel B: Foreign subsidiaries only 





Pre-tax earnings  6.99 6.96 2.20 -3.88 15.74  2210
Pre-tax profit  6.76 6.80 2.28 -4.12 15.53  2026
Capital 7.65 7.71 2.76 -1.84 16.04  2210
Labor 7.92 7.93 1.92 1.20 15.74  2210
Employees 4.31 4.30 1.89 0.00 11.80  2210
Financial leverage  0.64 0.68 0.37 -6.10 4.77  2210
C -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.43 0.53  2210
 
Panel C: Manufacturing firms 





Pre-tax earnings  7.69 7.69 2.43 -3.88 15.77  1484
Pre-tax profit  7.46 7.44 2.49 -4.12 15.24  1360
Capital 8.60 8.81 3.01 -0.32 17.66  1484
Labor 8.58 8.58 2.15 1.51 16.24  1484
Employees 4.99 5.00 2.08 0.00 12.07  1484
Financial leverage  0.61 0.64 0.27 -2.01 1.62  1484
C -0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.43 0.53  1484
 
Panel D: Manufacturing firms, foreign subsidiaries only 





Pre-tax earnings  6.93 6.92 2.19 -3.88 12.96  1008
Pre-tax profit  6.72 6.77 2.28 -4.12 12.80  922
Capital 7.53 7.63 2.67 -0.32 15.36  1008
Labor 7.86 7.83 1.88 1.51 13.02  1008
Employees 4.27 4.26 1.83 0.00 9.63  1008
Financial leverage  0.63 0.66 0.29 -2.01 1.62  1008
C -0.02 0.00 0.13 -0.43 0.53  1008
 
 
Panel E: Correlation matrix of main variables. Sample includes manufacturing firms and foreign 
subsidiaries only. P-values are between round brackets. Number of observations is reported 




  Financial 
leverage 
Per capita 







         
  [1008]        
         
Capital 0.77***  1.00       
  ( 0 . 0 0 )         
  [1008]  [1008]       
         
Labor  0.80***  0.84***  1.00      
  (0.00)  (0.00)       
  [1008]  [1008]  [1008]      
         
Employees  0.76*** 0.86*** 0.91***  1.00       
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)      
  [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008]       
         
Financial 
leverage -0.15***  -0.12*** -0.02  -0.08*** 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.01)       
  [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008]     
         
Per capita 
income  0.10*** 0.04 0.24***  -0.08**  0.12*** 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)     
  [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008]   
         
C -0.15***  -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.14*** 0.11***  0.09***  1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)   
  [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] [1008] 
  -31-Table 5.  Estimation of the profit shifting equation 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the profit shifting equation: 
i i u C + −γ )
i i i
r
i k l A b 4 3 2 1 β β β β + + + = . The dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings 
before interest and taxes. Labor (l) is the log of the total labor compensation. Capital (k) is the log 
of the amount of fixed assets. Per capita income (A) is the log of GDP per capita. C is the 
composite tax variable in the model, calculated using country-level effective tax rates and the 
firm’s total sales as a proxy for the tax base B. Regressions 2-4 include industry dummies at the 
2-digit NACE industry code level (not reported). Regression 3 includes a dummy variable 
indicating Eastern European firms and an interaction variable of the Eastern Europe dummy and 
the C variable. Regression 4 splits up the C variable into parts that represent profit shifting 
incentives vis-à-vis the parent and subsidiaries in other countries. We report White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the multinational firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Labor  0.641*** 0.639*** 0.635*** 0.637*** 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Capital  0.246*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Per capita income  -0.127*  -0.104*  -0.207  -0.103 
  (0.065) (0.063) (0.129) (0.063) 
C  -1.068*** -0.933*** -0.912***   
  (0.344) (0.331) (0.338)   
Eastern Europe*C      -0.310   
     (0.902)   
Eastern Europe      -0.290   
     (0.350)   
C vis-à-vis parent        -1.059*** 
       (0.389) 
C vis-à-vis other 
subsidiaries 
    -0.451 
       (0.899) 
      
Industry  dummies  No Yes Yes Yes 
F-test of no significance of 
industry dummies (p-
value) 
 3.64***  3.33***  3.65*** 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations  1008 1008 1008 1008 




  -32-Table 6.  Robustness of the estimated profit shifting equation 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the profit shifting equation. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes. Labor is the log of the total labor compensation. 
Employment is the log of the number of employees. Capital is the log of the amount of fixed 
assets. Per capita income is the log of GDP per capita. C is the composite tax variable in the 
model, calculated using country-level effective tax rates and a proxy for the firm’s tax base B. 
Financial leverage is total debt over total assets. Corruption is the ICRG corruption index, with 
higher values denoting less corruption. Treaty is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
subsidiary country and the parent country have signed a bilateral tax treaty (in effect in 1999), 
and zero otherwise.  In regression 1, C is calculated under the assumption that B equals 1 
throughout so that the costs of profit shifting are taken to be unrelated to the scale of activities at 
the multinational’s establishments. In regression 2, C is calculated using total assets as a proxy 
for  B to reflect that assets may be less misrepresented by transfer pricing than sales. In 
regressions 3 to 13, C is calculated using sales as a proxy for B. In regression 3, we use the log of 
the number of employees as a proxy for the labor input rather than the log of total labor 
compensation. In regression 4, we include observations on parent companies. In regression 5, we 
include all industries (not only manufacturing). In regressions 6 and 10, the dependent variable is 
the logarithm of pre-tax profits. In regression 7, we include a set of country dummies and a set of 
country dummies interacted with the C variable (both sets not reported). In regression 8, we 
exclude firms if we have incomplete data on more than 50 percent of the subsidiaries of the firm 
(of all subsidiaries located in Europe). Regressions 9 and 10 control for leverage. Regression 11 
controls for corruption at the country level.  Regression 12 controls for whether a treaty between 
the subsidiary and parent countries has been signed. The sample in regression 13 excludes 
subsidiaries located in Eastern Europe. All regressions include a constant and industry dummies 
at the 2-digit NACE industry code level (not reported). We report White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the multinational firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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  (0.059) (0.059)    (0.047) (0.033) (0.065) 
Employment    0.545**
* 
   






















  (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.056) (0.042) (0.089) 












  (0.437) (0.307) (0.347) (0.317) (0.230) (0.408) 
Financial 
leverage 
      
        
Corruption        
        
Treaty        
        
        
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1008 1008 1008 1484 2210  922 
R-squared  0.69 0.69 0.67 0.78 0.70 0.64 
  
  -34-(Table 6, continued) 






























  (0.037) (0.054) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) 
Per capita 
income 
 -0.007  -0.079  0.076  -0.103  -0.113*  -
0.371** 
    (0.079) (0.064) (0.086) (0.073) (0.063) (0.168) 













    (0.637) (0.326) (0.395) (0.342) (0.332) (0.338) 
Financial 
leverage 






   
     (0.208)  (0.246)       
Corruption         0.055    
         (0.064)    
Treaty        -0.134   
        (0.149)   
         
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







1.30         
(0.17) 
R-squared 0.71  0.69  0.70  0.67  0.69  0.69  0.69 
 
  -35-Table 7.  Comparison with results in Hines and Rice (1994) 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes. Labor is the log of 
the total labor compensation. Capital is the log of the amount of fixed assets. Per capita income is 
the log of per capita GDP. Average tax rate is the minimum of the accounting average tax rate 
and the top statutory tax rate, where the accounting average tax rate is calculated as taxes paid 
divided by the sum of pre-tax profits. If the accounting-based average tax rate is negative due to 
negative profits, we set the average tax rate to missing. Statutory tax rate is the statutory tax rate 
of the country of subsidiary location.  Effective tax rate is the effective tax rate of a subsidiary 
located in a country i with a parent company in country p. Difference in average tax rates is the 
difference in the average tax rate in country i and the top statutory tax rate in country p. 
Difference in statutory tax rates is the difference in the top statutory tax rates in countries i and  p. 
Difference in effective tax rates is the difference of the effective tax rate in country i and the top 
statutory tax rate in country p . Adjusted difference in statutory tax rates is ) 1 /( ) ( p p i t t t − − or the 
difference in statutory tax rates divided by one minus the statutory tax rate of country p. Adjusted 
difference in effective tax rates is  ) 1 /( ) ( p p i t t − − τ  or the difference in effective tax rates divided 
by one minus the statutory tax rate of country p. C is the composite tax variable calculated using 
effective tax rates and the firm’s total sales as a proxy for the tax base B. Regressions 1-2 are 
based on aggregate data with one observation for each subsidiary county, parent country pair. All 
other regressions use firm level observations. All regressions include a constant and industry 
dummies at the 2-digit NACE industry code level (not reported). We report White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the multinational firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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C              -
0.933**
* 
             (0.331) 
              
Industry 
dummies 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observatio
ns 
178 192  962  1008 1008 1008 1008  1008  1008 
R-squared  0.88  0.87 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69  0.69  0.69 
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This table reports instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the profit shifting equation. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes. Labor is the log of total 
labor compensation. Capital is the log of the amount of fixed assets. Per capita income is the log 
of GDP per capita of the country.  C is the composite tax variable calculated using country-level 
effective tax rates and the firm’s total sales as a proxy for the tax base B. Difference in effective 
tax rates is  ) 1 /( ) ( p p i t t − − τ  where τi is the effective tax rate of a subsidiary located in country i 
with a parent company located in country p and tp the top statutory tax rate of the country where 
the parent company is located. In regression 1, the log of the country’s total population is used as 
an instrument for the top statutory tax rate used to calculate the C variable. In regression 2, the 
difference between the log population of countries i and p is used as an instrument for C. 
Regression 3 is as regression 2 but excludes firms for which we have incomplete data on more 
than half of the subsidiaries of the firm. All regressions include a constant and industry dummies 
(not reported). We report White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors in 
parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the multinational firm level. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Labor 0.637***  0.637***  0.470*** 
 (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.078) 
Capital 0.233***  0.232***  0.298*** 
 (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.054) 
Per capita income  -0.092  -0.087  -0.002 
 (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.079) 
C -1.682**  -2.032**  -2.238* 
 (0.777)  (0.809)  (1.171) 
      
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared first-stage  0.28  0.27  0.36 
Observations 1008  1008  354 
R-squared 0.69  0.69  0.69 
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This table reports aggregate tax base shifting semi-elasticities with respect the effective tax rate 
and the top statutory rate of the country of location. Simulated aggregate effective tax rate semi-
elasticities are obtained as follows. For a given country, we increase the effective tax rate by 
0.01. This leads to changes in the C’s for all firms doing business in this country whether or not 











γˆ − =  for any firm located in country i. Aggregating the changes in   for all 




i B d to be used to 









− . The aggregate tax base 









− is simulated in an 
analogous fashion. We report the two semi-elasticities for all firms located in a country and 
separately for the groups of parent companies and foreign subsidiaries.  
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  All firms  Parent companies  Subsidiaries 
 
1% change in 
top statutory 
tax rate 
1% change in 
effective tax 
rate 




1% change in 
effective tax 
rate 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1% change in 
effective tax 
rate 
1% change in 
top statutory 
tax rate 
(5)  (5) 
Austria  1.57  1.57  0.33  0.33  2.25              2.25 
Belgium  3.38  3.37  3.72  3.71  2.10              2.10 
Bulgaria  1.04  1.04  0.24  0.24  2.17              2.17 
Czech 
Republic 1.11 1.08  0.16  0.16  1.12              1.09 
Denmark  1.64  1.41  1.53  1.27  2.53              2.53 
Estonia  2.55  0.30  0.73  0.73  2.71              0.26 
Finland  0.67  0.45  0.63  0.42  2.33              2.01 
France  0.64  0.59  0.29  0.29  2.22              1.96 
Germany  0.32  0.32  0.22  0.22  4.30              4.30 
Hungary  2.21  2.09  3.64  3.64  1.63              1.46 
Italy  0.62  0.57  0.15  0.10  3.09              3.09 
Luxembourg  1.05  1.05  0.06  0.06  2.50              2.50 
Netherlands  3.42  3.31  2.49  2.49  3.43              3.32 
Norway  0.61  0.41  0.44  0.28  2.42              1.72 
Poland  2.63  2.63  n.a.  n.a.  2.63              2.63 
Portugal  3.03  3.03  n.a.  n.a.  3.03              3.03 
Romania  3.47  0.50  n.a.  n.a.  3.47              0.50 
Slovak 
Republic  2.89  2.89  n.a.  n.a.  2.89              2.89 
Spain  1.01  0.94  0.32  0.25  2.47              2.38 
Sweden  1.52  1.37  1.29  1.25  2.19              1.72 
United 
Kingdom  1.13  1.10  1.00  0.98  2.70              2.56 
        
Average  1.74  1.43  1.01  0.97  2.58              2.21 
 
 
  -40-Table 10.  Estimates of international profit shifting and national tax revenue losses 
 
This table reports the estimated changes in national tax revenues due to international profit 
shifting. For this purpose, we use the instrumental variables estimate of γ ) from the model in 
Table 8, column 2. To estimate a multinational firm’s true profits in country i, we 
use ) 1 /( i
r
i i C B B γ ) − = . Profits shifted into country i by a firm are estimated as 
) 1 /( ˆ i i
r
i i C C B S γ γ ) − − = . Expenses incurred by shifting profits into country i by a firm are 
estimated by  . Firm-level data are aggregated to national true profits,  i i i B S E / ) )( ˆ 2 / 1 (
2 γ = i B , 
inward profit shifting  i S i E i i B S / , and aggregate profit shifting costs   and their ratios   a n d  
i i B E / . The estimated national tax change,  , in country i is calculated using tax system data 
and estimates of bilateral aggregated tax base shifting 
i dT
ij S ij E  and bilateral shifting expenses  in 
country i for a multinational domiciled in country j. Figures on  i B i S i E ,  ,  , and   are reported 
in millions of US dollars. 
i dT
 
i B  i S  i i B S /   i E  i i B E /   i dT   Country 
Austria 96.55 17.75 0.184 2.53 0.026 5.17
Belgium 2669.78 75.11 0.028 11.20 0.004 25.67
Bulgaria 12.86 1.79 0.139 0.17 0.013 0.44
Czech 
Republic 302.60 124.42 0.411 16.25 0.054 37.13
Denmark 1567.28 75.25 0.048 2.28 0.001 23.35
Estonia 8.88 0.60 0.067 0.07 0.008 0.14
Finland 3825.36 294.30 0.077 9.64 0.003 79.73
France 12600.00 50.55 0.004 43.39 0.003 2.86
Germany 18300.00 -5011.25 -0.274 879.02 0.048 -3166.61
Hungary 13.78 4.67 0.339 0.65 0.047 0.72
Italy 9577.71 -99.95 -0.010 23.31 0.002 -50.84
Luxembourg 19.97 2.02 0.101 0.19 0.010 0.68
Netherlands 321.74 25.98 0.081 2.07 0.006 8.37
Norway 1705.96 45.95 0.027 2.60 0.002 12.20
Poland 61.29 13.19 0.215 1.76 0.029 3.89
Portugal 9.12 0.76 0.083 0.02 0.002 0.28
Romania 23.63 -4.11 -0.174 0.33 0.014 -2.25
Slovak Rep  0.35 0.11 0.311 0.01 0.024 0.04
Spain 2338.70 109.32 0.047 9.86 0.004 34.81
Sweden 3718.19 313.21 0.084 24.39 0.007 81.19
United 
Kingdom 7854.55 501.53 0.064 27.40 0.003 142.27
Total 65028.29 -3458.80 -0.053 1057.13 0.016 -2760.75
 
  -41-Appendix 1. Aggregation of a multinational’s establishment within a country 
 
  This appendix shows that the international pattern of profit shifting at the country level is 
unaffected by whether the multinational has true profits 
j
i B   at establishments j = 1,…, k in 


















 be the optimal profit shifting into country i. This yields costs equal to  i . In the 
absence of aggregation, we can optimally allocate  to establishment j with . In the 

















































   







The first order condition with respect to sij is  , which shows that  optimally is 

























































which demonstrates that shifting costs in country i are not affected by the aggregation of 




  -42-Appendix 2. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Statutory tax 
rate 
Top statutory tax rate on 
corporate income 
(between 0 and 1) 
Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation; Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 
1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide, Ernst & Young  
Average tax 
rate 
Average tax rate 
constructed as ratio of 
taxes paid to pre-tax 
earnings 
Amadeus 
Data on sales and pre-tax profits from 
Amadeus. Data on effective tax rates from: 
Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation; Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 
1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide, Ernst & Young 
C  Composite tax variable 
(constructed using 
information on sales (not 
in log) and effective tax 
rates 
Amadeus; Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation; Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 
1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide 




Difference in average tax 
rate in one of the 
multinational’s countries 
of establishment and the 
multinational’s parent 
country’ top statutory tax 
rate (between 0 and 1) 
Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation; Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 
1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide 




Difference in effective tax 
rates in one of the 
multinational’s countries 
of establishment and the 
multinational’s parent 
country (between 0 and 1) 
  -43-Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation; Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 
1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide 




Difference in top statutory 
tax rates in one of the 
multinational’s countries 
of establishment and the 
multinational’s parent 
country (between 0 and 1) 
Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation; Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com); Corporate Taxes 
1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers; and Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide, Ernst & Young  
Effective tax 
rate 
Effective tax rate on 
income reported in a 
country for a 
multinational 
headquartered in the same 
or any other country 
(between 0 and 1) 
Capital   Amount of fixed assets in 
log 
Amadeus 
Employment  Number of employees in 
log 
Amadeus 
Labor  Total labor compensation  Amadeus 
Financial 
leverage 





Per capita GDP in log  World Bank Development Indicators 
Corruption   Index of corruption with 
higher values denoting 
less corruption 
International Country Risk Guide 
Pre-tax 
earnings 
Earnings before interest 
and taxes in log 
Amadeus 
Pre-tax profits  Pre-tax profits in logs  Amadeus 
Sales Total  sales  Amadeus 
Taxation of Companies in Europe, 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation, and Tax Analysts 
(www.taxanalysts.com). 
Treaty  Dummy variable equal to 
1 if there exists a treaty 
between a multinational’s 
foreign country of 
establishment and its 
parent country, and 0 
otherwise 
  -44-  -45-
Appendix 3.  Bilateral tax treaties in force as of 1999 
 
1=Bilateral tax treaty in force; 0=No bilateral tax treaty in force.  Source: Taxation of Companies 
in Europe, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), and Tax Analysts 













































































































































































































































































Austria     1  1  0  1  1  1  01101101100111  1  1  1  1  11111
B e l g i u m     1     1  1  1  0  1  01111101100111  1  1  1  0  01111
B u l g a r i a     1  1     1  1  1  1  01111100100111  1  1  1  1  01111
C r o a t i a     0  1  1     1  1  1  01111100100011  1  1  1  1  10111
C y p r u s   1  1  1  1     1  1  00111101100000  1  0  1  1  10111
Czech 
R e p u b l i c     1  0  1  1  1     1  11111101111111  1  1  1  1  11111
D e n m a r k     1  1  1  1  1  1     10111111011111  1  0  1  1  11011
E s t o n i a     0  0  0  0  0  1  1     1010011011011  1  0  0  0  10101
F i n l a n d     1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1   111111111110  1  1  1  0  11011
F r a n c e     1  1  1  1  1  1  1  01   11111100111  1  1  1  1  11111
G e r m a n y     1  1  1  1  1  1  1  111   1111111111  1  1  0  1  11111
Greece    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1   1 0 0 1 00111  1  0  1  1  00111
Hungary    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1111   01100111  1  1  1  1  11111
I c e l a n d     0  0  0  0  0  0  1  111100   0011111  1  1  0  1  00111
I r e l a n d     1  1  0  0  1  1  1  1111010   111111  1  1  0  1  01111
I t a l y     1  1  1  1  1  1  0  01111101   01111  1  1  1  1  11111
L a t v i a     0  0  0  0  0  1  1  110100110   1011  1  0  0  1  00101
L i t h u a n i a     0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1101001111   001  1  0  1  0  00100
Luxembourg  1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1111111100   11  1  0  1  1  01111
N e t h e r l a n d s    1  1  1  1  0  1  1  111111111101   1  0  0  1  1  11111
N o r w a y     1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1011111111111   1  1  1  1  10010
P o l a n d     1  1  1  1  1  1  1  11111111111101     1  1  1  11111
P o r t u g a l     1  1  1  1  0  1  0  01110111100001  1     1  1  11011
R o m a n i a     1  1  1  1  1  1  1  01101100101111  1  1     1  11111
Slovak 
R e p u b l i c     1  0  1  1  1  1  1  00111111110111  1  1  1     11111
S l o v e n i a     1  0  0  1  1  1  1  11110100100011  1  1  1  1     0111
S p a i n     1  1  1  0  0  1  1  01110101100110  1  1  1  1  0   111
S w e d e n     1  1  1  1  1  1  0  10111101111110  1  0  1  1  11   11
S w i t z e r l a n d    1  1  1  1  1  1  1  01111111100111  1  1  1  1  111   1
United 
Kingdom    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1111111110110  1  1  1  1  1111  
 